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ABSTRACT
This paper explores the transformation of corporate strategy into financial results, and by 
doing so, it does not fall into a single academic category of Accounting, Management or 
Economics. This study is important and valuable because making a great strategy does not 
guarantee a great result. The strategy might be misunderstood or disregarded and tends to 
incur dilution rather than coagulation during the transformation process. 
The challenges of such a study are the broad scope (i.e., to cover all the activities of a 
corporation) and the limited access to the internal information of a corporation (e.g., 
strategy, budget). But the study becomes possible if the scope is narrowed, a certain 
definition is adapted, and some presumptions are used. 
This paper examines the cases of two publicly traded retail corporations in the United 
States and Japan, contrasting their strategies and financial results. The implications drawn 
were:
z The simpler or less abstract a corporate strategy is, the better or more predictable the 
financial results are. 
z If structural level issues are dealt with at a higher level of the management process 
(i.e., strategic planning rather than operational planning, operational planning rather 
than implementation), the likelihood of the above transformation will be increased. 
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INTRODUCTION
To be successful in business, the importance of strategy goes without question. But at the 
same time, there should be no other time than now to require a simple strategy. Many 
corporations use the management process depicted in Figure 1. First, for strategic planning, 
they analyze industries, define positions, measure shares, draw a chart of 
strengths/weaknesses/opportunities/threats, and make a strategy. Second, for operational 
planning, they consider more short-term, specific, tangible actionable plans and draw up a 
budget. They then might implement and the results are analyzed and fed back to the 
beginning of the whole process. In other words, strategy, as an output of strategic planning, 
is transformed into a budget. A budget, as an outcome of operational planning, is 
transformed into a result. A result, as an outcome of implementation, is fed back to the 
beginning of the whole process.
The study of those transformations as an 
aggregate, rather than as separate processes, 
is very important and valuable. Having a 
great strategic planning process and making a 
great strategy do not guarantee a great result. 
Generally a dilution, rather than a 
coagulation, occurs during the process, 
especially at a large-sized corporation. If the 
strategy is complex, misunderstandings tend 
to occur. If unrealistic, credibility will be lost, 
leading to unplanned or undesired results. 
The instinct of this paper’s author, with two 
decades in practice, is that the simpler the 
strategy, the better the result. “Simpler” here 
means being non-superficial, realistic and 
clear about what to give up. “Better” here, 
means doing almost as planned, generating 
less surprise, and being consistent, honest and loyal to stakeholders. 
However, pursuing such a study poses a few challenges. One is that observation of the 
overall processes is too broad or impractical because those processes are the corporation’s 
entire activities. Another is the question of how to define the result. It could be related to 
financial results, market position, customer satisfaction or even environmental conditions. 
Yet a further challenge is how to access and obtain the relevant information and data of a 
certain corporation. Most companies do not disclose their strategy, budget or result. The 
author of this paper does not have any intention to refer to any confidential, internal 
information of his previous employers. But by narrowing the scope as follows, the study 
becomes possible. 
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z Focusing just on the starting point of output (i.e., the strategy) and the ending point 
(i.e., the result)
z Focusing on financial results
z Using the information and data of a publicly traded corporation 
A publicly traded corporation has to disclose its financial results regularly. It occasionally 
discloses its strategy, such as when its financial condition is difficult or some future 
financial arrangements are necessary. In such cases, a corporation needs to disclose and 
explain its strategy to investors, creditors or other external stakeholders and obtain their 
consensus. 
This paper explores the transformation of strategy into financial results by Amazon.com in 
the United States and by LAOX Ltd. in Japan. Both are publically traded retail 
corporations. Retail corporations were chosen because their value chain structures are 
simpler (i.e., without, or with less, research & development and manufacturing function) 
than the norm, and show a more direct transformation of strategy into financial results. 
Amazon.com and Laox Ltd. were chosen for the purpose of contrasting their financial 
results. The financial results of Amazon.com have been significantly improving, while 
those of Laox Ltd. have been falling free. 
This paper is organized into three sections. Section I explores the transformation of 
strategy into financial results by Amazon.com. Section II explores that of Laox Ltd. 
Section III develops implications. The author is aware that a conclusion cannot be drawn 
from the study of just two companies, but he believes that this paper adds some value to 
the management process study and wishes to contribute to opening the door between 
strategy and management accounting. 
SECTION I – THE CASE OF AMAZON.COM
Common Phenomena of the Retail Industry: In the retail industry, there is a golden 
rule that states “the bigger, the better.” Generally, as the size of a corporation becomes 
bigger, it obtains more purchase power and more internal efficiency. It negotiates more 
toughly with suppliers and vendors and purchases goods at a lower cost. It may introduce a 
powerful and efficient infrastructure and share it across the entire organization of the 
corporation. As a result, it can offer lower prices and attract more customers. This cycle 
continues, creating a good spiral, as shown in Figure 2. 
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In the last decade, the speed of this cycle 
seems to be accelerating mainly because 
of the development of the information 
system. For example, through the 
Internet, a corporation can monitor 
many of its competitor’s activities, such 
as pricing, selection, and customer 
conveniency, in a timely fashion and 
adapt quickly. Customers do the same 
and rush to corporations that offer the 
best value. The speed of the cycle 
therefore becomes naturally faster. In the 
last few years, the appearance of social networks and smart phone devices has accelerated 
the speed further, by enabling corporations and customers to access relevant information 
more efficiently and more frequently. However, in the course of this cycle, it is common 
for a start-up corporation to (1) face financial difficulties and (2) be pushed out of the 
market. While it still does not have much purchasing power or internal efficiency, it has to 
price low enough to attract customers, unless it has a significant differentiation from its 
competitors. In the case of Amazon.com (AMZN), (1) was applied but not (2). To 
understand why, we need to examine AMZN’s financial difficulties first, their financial 
arrangements second, and their transformation of strategy into financial results finally. 
Financial Difficulties: Table 1 shows AMZN’s operating loss for seven years from 1995 
to 2001. During this period, the gross margin was between 17.7% and 25.6%, while the 
expenses per revenue were between 38.7% and 79.5%, resulting in operating loss. But after 
2002, the gross margin has constantly been above 22.3%, while the expenses per revenue 
have been decreasing to below 20%, resulting in operating profit. The expenses can be 
broken down further into Fulfillment, Marketing, Technology and content, General and 
administrative, Stock-based compensation 1 , and Other expenses. Decrease in those 
expenses per revenue can be seen in all of those categories during the period from 1995 to 
2010.  This can be viewed as an improvement of internal efficiency, as shown in Figure 2. 
Additionally, other expenses significantly increased from 1998 to 2001 owing to the 
amortization of goodwill from purchased corporations. The reason for the constant, not
significantly improving, gross margin may be due to the addition of product categories. In 
1994, AMZN started with one product category of Books, but by 2010 they had dozens of 
product categories. Generally the gross margin of a newly added category is low, for the 
same reason as mentioned in the previous paragraph, even though that of the existing 
category is improving. If so, the overall gross margin can be consistent. 
1 Table 1 does not reflect the reclassification of stock-based compensation from 1998 to 2004.
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Financial Arrangements: The question arises here of how AMZN survived despite 
recognizing operating losses for seven years since its inception. What kind of financial 
arrangements were made, if any? Many companies would go bankrupt in such a condition. 
From here, the focus will shift from AMZN’s Income Statements to their Balance Sheets 
and Statements of Cash Flows. 
Three financial arrangements can be found in Table 2. One is the increase of long-term 
liabilities in 1999, mainly owing to the issuance of 4.75% convertible subordinated notes 
for $1,250 million. The second financial arrangement is also the increase of long-term 
liabilities in 2000, mainly owing to the issuance of 6.875% PEACS for €690 million 
(equivalent to $714 million at the exchange rate of 1.035). Both were due 10 years after the 
issuance and offered attractive future conversion prices. The third financial arrangement is 
the constant increase of additional paid-in capital from 1997 to 2000, mainly owing to the 
initial public offering in 1997 and to the acquisitions of corporations (e.g., Exchange.com, 
LiveBid, Accept.com, Alexa.com, Tool Crib) through the issuance of stocks, not cash.
A constant cash flow improvement can be found in Table 3. The free cash flow (i.e., cash 
inflow from operations less capital expenditure) of AMZN has been always better than the 
operating profit shown in Table 1, as well as improving earlier than the operating profit. 
From an early stage, AMZN emphasized long-term, sustainable free cash flow growth and 
Table 1: AMZN Selected Income Statements
(Millions of USD)
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
Revenues $1 $16 $148 $610 $1,640 $2,761 $3,122 $3,932 $5,263 $6,921 $8,490 $10,711 $14,835 $19,166 $24,509 $34,204
Cost of goods sold 0 12 119 476 1,349 2,106 2,323 2,940 4,006 5,319 6,451 8,255 11,482 14,896 18,978 26,561
Gross Margin 0 3 29 134 291 655 799 992 1,257 1,601 2,039 2,456 3,353 4,270 5,531 7,643
Fulfillment 414 374 392 477 590 745 937 1,292 1,658 2,052 2,898
Marketing 0 6 39 133 413 179 138 125 122 158 198 263 344 482 680 1,029
Technology and content 0 2 12 46 160 269 241 215 207 251 451 662 818 1,033 1,240 1,734
General and administrative 0 1 7 16 70 108 89 79 88 112 166 195 235 279 328 470
Stock-based compensation 2 31 24 4 68 88 57
Other expenses 46 223 521 362 47 3 (8) 47 10 9 (24) 102 106
Total expenses 0 9 58 243 896 1,515 1,208 926 985 1,160 1,607 2,067 2,698 3,428 4,402 6,237
Operating profit (loss) ($0) ($6) ($29) ($109) ($606) ($860) ($409) $66 $272 $441 $432 $389 $655 $842 $1,129 $1,406
Percentage of Revenue
Revenues 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%
Cost of goods sold 80.0% 78.0% 80.5% 78.1% 82.3% 76.3% 74.4% 74.8% 76.1% 76.9% 76.0% 77.1% 77.4% 77.7% 77.4% 77.7%
Gross Margin 20.0% 22.0% 19.5% 21.9% 17.7% 23.7% 25.6% 25.2% 23.9% 23.1% 24.0% 22.9% 22.6% 22.3% 22.6% 22.3%
Fulfillment 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 15.0% 12.0% 10.0% 9.1% 8.5% 8.8% 8.7% 8.7% 8.7% 8.4% 8.5%
Marketing 39.1% 38.7% 26.4% 21.7% 25.2% 6.5% 4.4% 3.2% 2.3% 2.3% 2.3% 2.5% 2.3% 2.5% 2.8% 3.0%
Technology and content 33.5% 14.7% 8.4% 7.6% 9.7% 9.7% 7.7% 5.5% 3.9% 3.6% 5.3% 6.2% 5.5% 5.4% 5.1% 5.1%
General and administrative 6.8% 6.6% 4.4% 2.6% 4.3% 3.9% 2.9% 2.0% 1.7% 1.6% 2.0% 1.8% 1.6% 1.5% 1.3% 1.4%
Stock-based compensation 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.3% 1.9% 0.9% 0.1% 1.7% 1.7% 0.8% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0%
Other expenses 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 7.6% 13.6% 18.9% 11.6% 1.2% 0.1% -0.1% 0.6% 0.1% 0.1% -0.1% 0.4% 0.3%
Total expenses 79.5% 59.9% 39.3% 39.8% 54.7% 54.9% 38.7% 23.6% 18.7% 16.8% 18.9% 19.3% 18.2% 17.9% 18.0% 18.2%
Operating profit (loss) -59.5% -38.0% -19.8% -17.9% -36.9% -31.1% -13.1% 1.7% 5.2% 6.4% 5.1% 3.6% 4.4% 4.4% 4.6% 4.1%
Table 2: AMZN Condensed Balance Sheets
(Millions of USD)
1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
Cash and equivalent $6 $2 $26 $133 $822 $540 $738 $1,102 $1,303 $1,013 $1,022 $2,539 $2,769 $3,444 $3,777
Other current assets 1 135 398 879 539 668 878 719 1,236 1,916 2,351 2,625 3,388 6,353 9,970
Current assets 7 137 424 1,012 1,361 1,208 1,616 1,821 2,539 2,929 3,373 5,164 6,157 9,797 13,747
Long-term assets 1 12 224 1,460 774 430 374 341 710 767 990 1,321 2,157 4,016 5,050
Total assets 8 149 648 2,472 2,135 1,638 1,990 2,162 3,249 3,696 4,363 6,485 8,314 13,813 18,797
Current liabilities 5 44 162 739 974 921 1,066 1,252 1,620 1,899 2,532 3,714 4,746 7,364 10,372
Long-term liabilities 77 348 1,466 2,127 2,156 2,277 1,945 1,855 1,551 1,400 1,574 896 1,192 1,561
Common stock 0 0 3 3 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 5 5
Additional paid-in capital 10 64 299 1,196 1,338 1,463 1,649 1,899 2,124 2,263 2,517 2,563 3,521 5,136 5,725
Others (1) (2) (1) (51) (16) (46) 3 35 30 6 (253) 5 (123) (56) (190)
Retained earnings (losses) (6) (34) (162) (882) (2,292) (2,860) (3,009) (2,973) (2,384) (2,027) (1,837) (1,375) (730) 172 1,324
Total liabilities and stockholders' equity $8 $149 $648 $2,472 $2,135 $1,638 $1,990 $2,162 $3,249 $3,696 $4,363 $6,485 $8,314 $13,813 $18,797
Notes
Current assets less current liabilities $2 $93 $263 $273 $387 $287 $550 $569 $919 $1,030 $841 $1,450 $1,411 $2,433 $3,375
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has been improving DPO, DSO, inventory, and so forth. In addition, AMZN changed the 
order of financial statements in their annual reports from the year ending in December 31, 
2003. Previously, they presented financial statements in the order of Balance Sheet, 
Income Statement, Statement of Cash Flows and Stockholders’ Equity. Since 2003, they 
present the financial statements in the order of Statement of Cash Flows, Income 
Statement, Balance Sheet and Stockholders’ Equity. AMZN is unique in using this order 
(i.e., placing the Statement of Cash Flows at the beginning). This can be another signal that 
they emphasize free cash flow.
Thus, AMZN maintained a healthy cash level, even during a financially difficult period, 
kept growing, and finally established a strong position in the retail market: Its current 
assets have been always exceeding its current liabilities since its inception as shown in 
Table 2. Undoubtedly, good financial arrangements were made. 
Strategy’s Effect on Financial Arrangements: Then, the next question arises as to how 
such arrangements were made. Was it done by chance or planned much in advance? To be 
more specific, which management process, shown in Figure 1, triggered those financial 
arrangements? Was it strategic planning, operational planning, implementation, or a 
combination of those? Other than by interviewing AMZN executives at the time, there is 
no way to reach the answer of this question. Search Engines do not provide the answer 
either. But AMZN’s public disclosure during the financially difficult period should provide 
some hints. As mentioned earlier, a publicly traded corporation occasionally needs to 
explain its strategy to investors, creditors or other external stakeholders and to obtain their 
consensus. Some hints were found in the letters to shareholders from 1997 to 2000. The 
following are quotes from those:
z The stronger our market leadership, the more powerful our economic model. Market 
leadership can translate directly to higher revenue, higher profitability, greater capital 
velocity, and correspondingly stronger returns on invested capital (1997).
z Our goal is to move quickly to solidify and extend our current position while we begin 
to pursue the online commerce opportunities in other areas (1997). 
z We will continue to make investment decisions in light of long-term market leadership 
considerations rather than short-term profitability considerations or short-term Wall 
Street reactions (1997).
Table 3: AMZN Selected Statements of Cash Flows
(Millions of USD)
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
Cash flows from operating activities ($0) ($2) $4 $31 ($91) ($130) ($120) $174 $392 $566 $733 $702 $1,405 $1,697 $3,293 $3,495
Investment to purchase of PP&E (0) (1) (7) (28) (287) (135) (50) (39) (46) (89) (204) (216) (224) (333) (373) (979)
Free Cash Flow ($0) ($3) ($4) $3 ($378) ($265) ($170) $135 $346 $477 $529 $486 $1,181 $1,364 $2,920 $2,516
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z When forced to choose between optimizing the appearance of our GAAP accounting 
and maximizing the present value of future cash flows, we'll take the cash flows (1997).
z We will balance our focus on growth with emphasis on long-term profitability and 
capital management. At this stage, we choose to prioritize growth because we believe 
that scale is central to achieving the potential of our business. We aren't so bold as to 
claim that the above is the "right" investment philosophy, but it's ours, and we would 
be remiss if we weren't clear in the approach we have taken and will continue to take 
(1997).
z In our 1997 letter to shareholders (our first), we detailed our long-term investment 
approach. Because we continue to add many new shareholders, we’ve appended that 
letter immediately after this year’s. I invite you to please read the section entitled It’s 
All About the Long Term, as it is the best way I know to help make sure we’re the 
kind of corporation you want to be invested in. As we wrote there, we don’t claim it’s 
the right philosophy, we just claim it’s ours (1998).
z As I usually do, I’ve appended our 1997 letter, our first letter to shareholders. It gets 
more interesting every year that goes by, in part because so little has changed. I 
especially draw your attention to the section entitled ‘‘It’s All About the Long Term’’ 
(1999, 2000).
Repeatedly, (i) the establishment of long-term market leadership and (ii) the prioritization 
of growth and long-term cash flow rather than short-term profitability were emphasized. 
AMZN discloses their vision in their investor relationship website2 to be earth's most 
customer-centric company and to build a place where people can come to find and 
discover anything they might want to buy online. But they do not mention their long-term 
goal or strategy. But (i) can be presumed as their long-term goal and (ii) as their strategy. 
Although there are many definitions of strategy, one of the well-known definitions is 
"Strategy is the basic goals and objectives of the organization, the major programs of 
action chosen to reach these goals and objectives, and the major pattern of resource 
allocation used to relate the organization to its environment."3 In AMZN’s case, (ii) is the 
major programs of actions to reach (i), and the major pattern of resource allocation, in 
agreement with the definition. Thus, the presumption made here can be assumed to be 
fairly accurate. 
Under the above presumption, the beauty of AMZN’s strategy is:
z High consistency with the  long-term goal 
2 http://phx.corporate-ir.net/phoenix.zhtml?c=97664&p=irol-faq
3 Schendel and Hatten (1972)
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z Prediction in advance of the short-term profitability issue, but still, clear prioritization 
of growth and long-term cash flow rather than the short-term profitability
z Openness and honesty in its disclosure of the above to the public
Generally, it is easy for a publicly traded corporation to announce positive matters but 
difficult to announce negative matters (e.g., lower prioritization of short-term profitability). 
But since its inception, AMZN did not refrain from announcing negative information. 
Their clear, consistent and honest strategy must have avoided a lot of confusion (e.g., 
which to emphasize, revenue or profit?) among internal and external stakeholders, gained 
those people’s trust, especially from investors for convertible subordinated notes issued in 
1999 and 2000, and contributed to overcoming the financially difficulties. 
Transformation of a strategy into financial results: AMZN’s vision, to be earth’s most 
customer-centric company and to build a place where people can come and find and 
discover anything they might want to buy online, became more tangible and was 
transformed into their goal of moving quickly and establishing the long-term market 
leadership. Behind the transformation, there might be ideas that the bigger, the better, or 
that the remaining number of seats for market leadership is limited. Their strategy clearly 
indicated prioritization of growth and long-term cash flow rather than short-term 
profitability to reach to their long-term goal and was transformed into their financial results, 
almost exactly as planned. AMZN’s revenue grew 34 thousand times from 1995 to 2010. 
Operating loss was incurred from 1995 to 2001, but operating profit has been in place 
from 2002 to 2010. Healthy cash and equivalent have been maintained from 1995 to 2010. 
Behind the transformation, there might be the idea that aggressively seeking revenue 
growth requires accepting operating loss at the early stage. Figure 3 summarizes those 
transformations. 
Despite some uncertainty of the presumption made here, AMZN’s case can still be 
concluded as a successful transformation of strategy to financial results.  
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SECTION II – THE CASE OF LAOX LTD
Laox Ltd and their Environment: Laox Ltd (LAOX) is a publicly traded corporation in 
Japan that focuses on consumer electronics and home appliances (CE&HA) retail business. 
They were incorporated in 1976 and listed in the second section of the Tokyo Stock 
Exchange in 1999. They were strong in audio and media segments, and used to be a 
symbolic CE&HA retail corporation in Japan, having  many stores near Akihabara station 
in Tokyo. But their revenue4 peaked in 2001 and has been falling down ever since as 
shown in Figure 4. The major reason for the decrease is the customers lost to road-side or 
rail-side corporations that run low-cost operations and offer lower prices to customers. 
Although LAOX’s business is not fully 
compatible with that of AMZN, it was 
chosen here for the purpose of contrasting 
its strategy and financial results with those 
of AMZN. In the difficult financial 
conditions mentioned above, LAOX’s 
strategy should have been bolder and 
clearer than that of AMZN and expected 
to be transforned into financial results in 
the shorter term. To examine the case of 
LAOX, the following paragraphs are 
organized in the order of Strategy, 
Financial Results, and Dilemma.
4 Based on statutory GAAP in Japan, the fiscal year ending March 31
Vision (Presumed) Long-term Goal (Presumed) Strategy Financial Results
Be the earth's most
customer-centric company
Build a place where people
can come to find and
discover anything they might
want to buy online
Establish the long-term
market leadership quickly
Prioritize growth, long-term
cash flow rather than short-
term profitability
Revenue grew from $1M in
1995 to $34.2B in 2010.
Operational loss incurred
from 1995 to 2001,
Operational profit incurred
from 2002 to 2010
Healthy cash and equivalent
maintained from 1995 to
2010.
The bigger, the better.
Remaining number of seats
of market leadership is
limited.
Seek aggressively for
revenue growth, and
possibly accept operational
loss as a result in the early
stage.
Figure 3: Transformation of Vision, Long-term Goal, Strategy and Financial Results
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Figure 4: LAOX Historical Revenue
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Strategy: To find LAOX’s strategy, the same methodology described in the Introduction 
and Case of AMZN sections, was applied. A publicly traded corporation discloses its 
strategy occasionally, such as when its financial condition is difficult or some future 
financial arrangements are necessary. In such cases, the corporation needs to disclose and 
explain its strategy to investors, creditors or other external stakeholders to obtain their 
consensus. In the case of LAOX, its revenue decreased sharply from 2005 to 2007 as 
shown in Figure 4. Some hints are found in their annual report5 for that period:
a. Our most important objective is to adapt to the changing environment (2005).
b. Under the slogan of “adaption to change and strength of basics,” we’ve worked hard 
to innovate ourselves. Major items, performed in the first half of the fiscal year, were 
reducing indirect expenses, such as consolidating headquarters floors, reducing 
logistics costs, including industrial waste disposal,  introducing a new information 
system, including elimination of  under-utilized systems, consolidation of information 
systems, usage of an Internet-based daily morning assembly, and revolution of 
employee consciousness, such as discontinuation of customer-waiting style and 
changing price negotiation styles. In the second half, we’ve started an aggressive 
revolution. Major changes are promotion of focused items, such as selecting such 
items and lowering their purchase costs and prices, revolution of merchandising, such 
as adapting to the environment and releasing information to stores; and revolution of 
floors in stores, such as mass product display, recommendation of usage, and 
combination of products (2005). 
c. We will accelerate the speed of opening up “resolution-type stores” and introduce 
new types of customer support programs to obtain new customers, to keep existing 
customers and to increase revenue (2005).
d. Our most important objective is to adapt to the changing environment (2006).
e. We opened ten, closed four, and renewed eight stores (2006).
f. We will increase our service level by increasing delivery options and customer 
satisfaction by LAOX master and we will establish different marketing methodologies 
according to the segment. We will introduce an early retirement program and close 
unprofitable stores (2006).
5 The above quotes written in Japanese were translated into English by the author’s best effort. There might be errors and 
misinterpretations. For the original, please refer to 
<http://www.ullet.com/%E3%83%A9%E3%82%AA%E3%83%83%E3%82%AF%E3%82%B9/EDINET#EDINET/page
/2/ranking/report>
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g. Our most important objective is to stop the decrease of revenue and to be profitable 
(2007).
h. We closed 18 unprofitable stores (2007).
i. We will expand the selection of supply, consumables, and kitchen products and 
promote them (2007). 
Using the same definition mentioned previously, statements b, c, e, f, h, and i can be 
presumed to be LAOX’s strategy because those are the major programs of action and 
resource allocations to reach to the objectives of a, d and g. There might be a disagreement 
with this presumption, such as “LAOX had a totally different strategy internally and they 
just did not disclose them externally, considering the competition.” In that case, the author 
considers that that would be a breach of fiduciary duty to stakeholders not to disclose 
material information in such a difficult environment, and therefore the presumption 
remains reasonable.   
The author’s impressions of LAOX’s (presumed) strategy compared with AMZN’s 
strategy are:
z More itemized but each refers to a relatively minor financial impact; questionable if 
objectives could be achieved from those
z No mention of specific actions vis à vis the fundamental issue of competitive pricing
As opposed to the repeated usage of “revolution” in statements a to i, the author could not 
find any revolutional strategy, such as discontinuation of certain segments or change in the 
business structure. 
Financial Results: Table 4 shows the LAOX selected financials based on the statutory 
GAAP in Japan (JGAAP) with reclassifications of the loyalty point reserve from other 
expenses to contra-revenue and of the vendor purchase discount from other incomes to 
contra-COGS. Under JGAAP, those are reclassified below the operating profit, but in 
practical terms, are above it. The period covers that after 2004, which might show the 
effect of the above strategy. Despite LAOX’ strategy, both its revenue and its profit went 
in the wrong direction. Revenue decreased by 92.5% from Y129.1B in 2005 to Y9.7B in 
2010. Favorable impacts from focused items’ promotion (b), revolution of store floors (b), 
opening up “resolution-type stores” (c),  and introduction of new customer support 
programs (c) did not materialize, as shown in Table 4. 
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The cost of goods sold as percentage of revenue fluctuated between 17.0% and 20.2%, 
probably reflecting the focused items’ promotion (b) and the opening up of “resolution-
type stores” (c).
Expenses as a percentage of revenue increased significantly from 19.3% in 2005 to 40.0% 
in 2010. As regards salaries, a favorable impact of early retirement programs (d) must have 
been included, yet the percentage of salaries against revenue continued to increase from 
8.1% in 2005 to 14.6% in 2010. As for rents, a favorable impact of closing stores (e), (f) 
and (h) must have been included, yet the percentage continued to increase from 3.9% in 
2005 to 7.7% in 2009. 
As a result, operating losses were incurred from 2007 to 2010.  With extraordinary losses 
from writing off PP&E, LAOX’s stockholders equity decreased by 90.6%, from Y37.3B in 
2005 to Y3.5B in 2010. Additionally, a going-concern opinion was issued by their external 
auditor in 2006. 
Table 4: LAOX Selected Financials
(Millions of JPY)
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 Simple
Average
Revenues (+) 129,068 103,357 80,635 58,965 40,636 9,684
Cost of goods sold (+) 104,437 82,439 64,902 48,207 33,734 7,912
Gross margin 24,631 20,918 15,733 10,758 6,902 1,772
Expenses
Salaries (-) 10,498 8,460 7,042 4,757 4,200 1,412
Rents 5,015 4,234 4,487 4,273 3,146 678
Advertisement 1,642 1,169 1,107 987 751 57
Other expenses 7,708 6,735 6,604 5,974 5,211 1,729
Total expenses 24,863 20,598 19,240 15,991 13,308 3,876
Operating profit (loss) (232) 320 (3,507) (5,233) (6,406) (2,104)
Extraordinary gain (loss) (9,928) (10,561) (7,143) (4,307) (6,644) (998)
Percentage of Revenue
Revenues (+) 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%
Cost of goods sold (+) 80.9% 79.8% 80.5% 81.8% 83.0% 81.7%
Gross margin 19.1% 20.2% 19.5% 18.2% 17.0% 18.3% 18.7%
Expenses
Salaries (-) 8.1% 8.2% 8.7% 8.1% 10.3% 14.6% 9.7%
Rents 3.9% 4.1% 5.6% 7.2% 7.7% 7.0% 5.9%
Advertisement 1.3% 1.1% 1.4% 1.7% 1.8% 0.6% 1.3%
Other expenses 6.0% 6.5% 8.2% 10.1% 12.8% 17.9% 10.2%
Total expenses 19.3% 19.9% 23.9% 27.1% 32.7% 40.0% 27.2%
Operating profit (loss) -0.2% 0.3% -4.3% -8.9% -15.8% -21.7% -8.4%
Extraordinary gain (loss) -7.7% -10.2% -8.9% -7.3% -16.3% -10.3%
Common stock 19,011 19,011 19,011 6,000 6,000 2,000
Additional paid-in capital 20,570 16,286 7,336 22,347 10,826 9,355
Retained earnings (losses) (2,066) (8,013) (4,355) (10,348) (11,386) (7,422)
Other stockholder's equities (199) 14 439 16 (899) (428)
Total stockholders' equities 37,316 27,298 22,431 18,015 4,541 3,505
Notes
(+) Includes reclassifications, mentioned in Financial Results.
(-) Includes bonuses, benefits and retirements.
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Dilemma: Figure 5 summarizes the relationship among LAOX’s objectives, strategies, and 
financial results, as well as possible dilemmas. 
The first dilemma might be LAOX could not conduct a drastic restructuring (e.g., 
discontinuation of certain business or geographic segments) until 2009 due to seeking both 
revenue and profitability. One option to increase profitability, ignoring the decrease of 
revenue, could be discontinuation of certain business or geographic segments that were 
less profitable.  Table 5 shows that LAOX did not discontinue any business segments from 
2005 to 2008. The largest change in revenue composition was only 5.2% of the PC 
segment from 20.9% in 2005 to 5.4% in 2008. 
The second dilemma might be that LAOX could not drastically close stores (i.e., 
geographic segment) or reduce the number of associated employees until 2009, also due to 
seeking revenue. 
The third dilemma might be that closing stores and reducing the number of employees 
took time, while they were simultaneously sustaining pressure from competitors’ pricing 
and their financial condition was worsening. In Japan, the contract term of many 
commercial facilities is two years and the reduction of employees should be on an agreed-
upon basis between employer and employees.
Objectives Strategy Financial Results
(ii) Adopt to changing
enviroment
(+) Maintain existing segments
Revenue decreased 92.7%
from Y129.1B in 2005 to Y9.4B
in 2011
(viii) Stop decrease of revenue
and be profitable
(ii) Promote selected items
(iii) Open resolution-type stores
(ix) Expand supply,
consumables, and kitchen
segments
(+) Discontinue unprofitable
segments
(v), (vi), (viii) Close stores (to
reduce rent and related
expenses)
(vi) Introduce early retirement
program (to reduce salary
related expenses)
(+) Achieve the above while the
financial condition is healthy
Environment
Competitive pricing pressure
from road-side or rail-side
corporations
Operational loss incurred from
2006 to 2010.
Stockholders equity decreased
90.6% from 37.3B in 2004 to
Y3.5B in 2009
Going-concern opinion was
issued in 2006
Notes: (+) Author’s estimation
Revenue
Portfolio
COGS
Expenses
Dilemma 1
Dilemma 3
Dilemma 2
Figure 5: LAOX’s Dilemma
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SECTION III – IMPLICATIONS
The author understands that this study has several limitations. First, only two corporations’ 
cases were studied. Second, no internal information or confirmation was obtained, and 
only public information was used. Third, the author used a certain definition and some 
presumptions. Despite such limitations, the author considers the following to be the 
implications to be drawn from this study with regard to transformation of strategy into 
financial results.
z The simpler or less abstract a corporate strategy is, the better or more predictable the 
financial results are. 
z If structural level issues are dealt with at a higher level of the management process 
(i.e., strategic planning rather than operational planning, operational planning rather 
than implementation), the likelihood of the above transformation will be increased. 
AMZN’s long-term goal was clearer and non-abstract, mentioning the prioritizations of 
growth(of revenue) and long-term free cash flow rather than short-term profitability from 
its inception. LAOX’s objective was abstract (i.e., adapting to the changing environment) 
in 2005 and 2006 and became specific (i.e., maintaining its revenue and becoming 
profitable) in 2007, by which time their revenue had been decreasing for 6 years. The 
author also considers that seeking both revenue and profitability was optimistic. LAOX’s 
average percentage of expenses per revenue from 2004 to 2010 was 27.2%. Generally, for 
road-side or rail-side corporations, it was less than 15%, as they took advantage of large-
scale, fewer-floored, lower-cost operations. Such a gap between LAOX and road-side or 
rail-side corporations does not seem to have been filled by efforts in operational planning 
and implementation.
Table 5: LAOX Segment Information
(Billions of JPY)
Changes
Revenue (+) COGS (+) Revenuecomposition Revenue
 (+) COGS (+) Revenuecomposition
Revenue
composition
Home appliances TV 10.9 9.0 1.9 17.3% 10.5% 5.0 4.0 1.0 19.1% 12.3% 1.8%
Video 7.7 6.5 1.2 15.1% 7.4% 2.9 2.4 0.5 17.0% 7.1% -0.3%
Audio 6.8 5.6 1.2 17.0% 6.6% 2.3 1.8 0.6 23.9% 5.7% -0.9%
Refrigerator 3.3 2.5 0.8 25.0% 3.2% 1.4 1.2 0.2 14.1% 3.5% 0.3%
Washing machine 4.0 3.0 1.0 25.7% 3.9% 1.6 1.4 0.2 11.1% 3.9% 0.1%
Cooking 7.7 5.7 2.0 25.4% 7.4% 3.8 2.7 1.1 28.1% 9.4% 1.9%
Air conditioning 5.9 4.6 1.3 22.8% 5.7% 2.9 2.4 0.5 17.0% 7.1% 1.4%
Total H&A 46.3 36.9 9.4 20.2% 44.8% 19.9 16.0 3.9 19.8% 49.1% 4.3%
Consumer electronic PC 11.0 10.4 0.6 5.5% 10.6% 2.2 1.8 0.5 20.5% 5.4% -5.2%
Referral 16.9 13.8 3.1 18.6% 16.3% 4.7 3.8 0.9 18.6% 11.6% -4.8%
Software 4.4 3.7 0.7 16.7% 4.3% 1.5 1.2 0.3 19.8% 3.7% -0.6%
Telephone 3.1 1.9 1.2 39.3% 3.0% 2.4 2.2 0.2 8.9% 5.9% 2.9%
Others 19.8 15.4 4.4 22.0% 19.1% 9.6 8.5 1.1 11.1% 23.7% 4.5%
Total Information 55.2 45.1 10.0 18.2% 53.4% 20.4 17.5 2.9 14.2% 50.3% -3.1%
Others 1.9 0.4 1.5 79.2% 1.8% 0.3 0.2 0.1 19.8% 0.7% -1.1%
Total 103.4 82.4 20.9 20.2% 100.0% 40.6 33.7 6.9 17.0% 100.0% 0.0%
Notes
(+) Includes reclassifications, mentioned in Financial Results.
Gross margin Gross margin
2006 2009
― ―198
AMZN’s strategy stayed at a relatively high level, whereas LAOX’s strategy itemized 
relatively minor items. Possibly LAOX’s strategy had the three dilemmas mentioned earlier. 
The two implications above stem from the author’s experience as regional Chief Financial 
Officer at NASDAQ corporations over the past 10 years. For example, when he visited 
several countries for annual budgeting processes, he was surprised to see so many different 
interpretations of a corporate strategy and made efforts to correct them. 
He also observed that the degree of success of the transformation becomes more visible 
when the economy is sluggish. When the economy is growing, financial results tend to be 
better and few questions arise as to whether this is due to a successful transformation of 
the corporation’s strategy. But when the economy is sluggish, competition becomes 
tougher and the corporation faces a lot of resource limitations. When the corporation’s 
strategy deals with structural issues, the financial results are generally as expected. 
In this way, he believes that this study would be useful, especially in the current sluggish 
economy. He also hopes that this study would be improved and developed by examining 
more relevant cases, reducing its limitations and widening its scope.
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ࠝᢒ㘓ࠞ
ᮏ✏ࡣ௻ᴗᡓ␎ࡢ㈈ົᴗ⦼࡬ࡢኚ᥮࡟ࡘ࠸࡚᥈ồࡋࠊᏛ⾡ⓗศ㢮ࡣ༢య࡜
ࡋ࡚ࡢ఍ィᏛࠊ⤒ႠᏛࠊ⤒῭Ꮫࡢ࠸ࡎࢀ࡟ࡶᒓࡋ࡞࠸ࠋࡇࡢ᥈ồࡣࠊ㔜せ
࠿ࡘ᭷ព⩏࡛࠶ࡿࠋ࡞ࡐ࡞ࡽࠊඃࢀࡓᡓ␎ࡢ⟇ᐃࡀࠊᚲࡎࡋࡶඃࢀࡓ㈈ົ
ᴗ⦼࡟ࡘ࡞ࡀࡿ࡜ࡣ㝈ࡽ࡞࠸࠿ࡽ࡛࠶ࡿࠋ௻ᴗάືࡢ୰࡛ࠊᡓ␎ࡀㄗゎࠊ
↓どࡉࢀࡿ஦ࡣ⌋ࡋ࠸஦࡛ࡣ࡞ࡃࠊཪࠊ௻ᴗᡓ␎ࡢ㈈ົᴗ⦼࡬ࡢኚ᥮㐣⛬
࡛ࡣࠊ⃰⦰໬࡛ࡣ࡞ࡃࠊᕼⷧ໬ࡀ㉳ࡇࡿ஦ࡀ୍⯡ⓗ࡛࠶ࡿࠋ
ᮏ᥈ồ࡟ࡣࠊ㸰ࡘࡢ኱ࡁ࡞㞀ቨࡀᏑᅾࡋࡓࠋ୍ࡘࡣࠊ௻ᴗάື඲࡚ࢆᢕᥱ
ࡋࡼ࠺࡜ࡍࡿ࡜ᑐ㇟⠊ᅖࡀ኱ࡁࡃ࡞ࡾࡍࡂࡿ஦ࠊࡶ࠺୍ࡘࡣࠊᡓ␎ࠊண⟬
➼ࡢ௻ᴗෆ㒊᝟ሗࢆධᡭࡍࡿ஦ࡀᅔ㞴࡞஦࡛࠶ࡿࠋࡋ࠿ࡋࠊᑐ㇟⠊ᅖࢆ⤠
ࡾࠊ࠸ࡃࡘ࠿ࡢᐃ⩏࡜௬ᐃࢆ㐺⏝ࡍࡿ஦࡟ࡼࡾࠊࡇࡢ㞀ቨࡣඞ᭹ࡉࢀࡓࠋ
ᮏ✏࡛ࡣࠊ⡿ᅜࠊ᪥ᮏ࡟࠾ࡅࡿୖሙᑠ኎௻ᴗ㸰♫ࡢࢣ࣮ࢫࢆྲྀࡾᢅ࠸ࠊ௻
ᴗᡓ␎ࠊ㈈ົᴗ⦼ࢆᑐẚࡉࡏ࡞ࡀࡽ⪃ᐹࢆ㐍ࡵࡓࠋࡑࡇ࠿ࡽ᥎ㄽࡉࢀࡓ⤖
ᯝࡣࠊୗグࡢ࡜࠾ࡾ࡛࠶ࡿࠋ
z ௻ᴗᡓ␎ࡀࡼࡾ༢⣧ࠊ㠀ᢳ㇟ⓗ࡛࠶ࢀࡤࠊࡼࡾពᅗࡋࡓ㈈ົᴗ⦼࡟ኚ
᥮ࡉࢀࡿ☜⋡ࡀ㧗ࡲࡿ
z ᰿ᮏⓗၥ㢟ࡀ⤒Ⴀ⟶⌮ࣉࣟࢭࢫࡢࠊࡼࡾୖὶ(౛㸸ᐇ᪋ィ⏬࡛ࣞ࣋ࣝ
࡞ࡃࠊᡓ␎ィ⏬ࣞ࣋ࣝࠊᐇ᪋࡛ࣞ࣋ࣝ࡞ࡃᐇ᪋ィ⏬ࣞ࣋ࣝ)࡛ᑐฎࡉ
ࢀࢀࡤࠊ᭦࡟ୖグࡢ☜⋡ࡀ㧗ࡲࡿ
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